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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses recent attempts to use essentialist arguments based on the work of Kripke and Put-
nam to ground causal necessity in the world. I argue in particular that a recent argument by Alexander Bird 
relies on controversial intuitions about the natures of substances which no Humean would accept. While a 
case can be made that essentialism reflects some assumptions within scientific practice, the same can be 
said of Humeanism, and ultimately neither Bird’s arguments, nor any empirical facts, can decide the ques-
tion either way.  
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1. Introduction: Essentialism and natural kinds 
Since Hume denied that there was causal necessity in the world, philosophers of sci-
ence have faced a dilemma. Those who agree with Hume seem forced to concede that 
the only difference between genuinely causal and accidental regularities lies within us, 
or is determined by the way we systematise the world. Those who wish to locate 
causal necessity in something more objective face what van Fraassen (1989) has called 
the ‘Identification Problem’: given that causal necessity is not simply logical necessity, 
what sense can we make of this notion, and how is science to uncover these necessi-
ties? 
 Kripke’s and Putnam’s work in the 1970s offered a new angle on this issue, with 
the claim that certain necessary truths are discovered by science, namely those giving 
the essential natures or real essences of natural kinds. Intuitively, the essential proper-
ties of a kind are the properties of its members which make those individuals mem-
bers of that kind and not another. This echoes Locke’s conception of a real essence, 
which is that “whereby [particular substances] are of this or that species” (Essay, 
II.xxxi.6). In the modern essentialist literature, an essential property of a kind is often 
construed as one which an object must possess in order to be a member of that kind, 
and which no member of the kind may lack. That is, kind essences give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for kind-membership.1  
 Kripke and Putnam have famously argued that natural kinds have certain of their 
properties essentially. The examples of the identity between water and H2O or the 
claim that gold has atomic number 79 demonstrate the success of science in telling us 
about the nature of the world around us: in addition, the claim that these truths are 
necessary a posteriori also seems to suggest that science can tell us substantive necessary 
                                                     
1 This of course neglects Locke’s other main claim about real essence, which is that an object’s observable 
properties ‘flow from’ its essence which is the cause of its secondary qualities. For a more substantive 
conception of essence, see Fine (1994).  
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truths about the world. Despite some well-known challenges to this view (for exam-
ple, Salmon 1982), to which I will return later in the paper, the existence of necessary 
a posteriori truths such as these remains an attractive idea, and one which many find 
compelling.  
 Essentialist claims of these kinds, though, do not provide a source of causal neces-
sity. There is no causal relationship between being water and being H2O or between 
being gold and having atomic number 79. These are just (part of) what it is to be water 
or to be gold, just as having no hair on one’s head does not cause one to be bald, it 
just is being bald. The further claim, made by authors such as Ellis and Lierse (1994), 
Elder (1994), Ellis (2001, 2002), Bird (2001, 2002) is that essential properties of kinds 
include not just what those kinds are, but also what they can do. In other words, there 
are causal relationships between members of kinds which are part of the nature of 
those kinds and which therefore could not fail to hold. These causal relationships 
could not be different unless the world contained different kinds of things. If this is 
correct, such relationships would hold of necessity, and this necessity would be non-
trivial and substantive, not just a matter of logic, but something we needed to find out 
empirically. Moreover, the source of the necessity would be firmly in the world, in the 
nature of the kinds themselves, rather than in us. 
2. Essentialist arguments for the necessity of the laws of nature 
Brian Ellis argues that the dispositions possessed by kinds of things in the world are 
essential to being that kind of thing. The various chemical substances and physical 
particles which make them up possess behavioural dispositions which they could not 
lack, and remain the same substances or particles. The disposition to form a structure 
which conducts electricity is as much a part of what it is to be a copper atom as having 
twenty-nine protons in the nucleus. Science tells us what copper is, and its properties. 
Something which did not behave in the same way would not be copper.  
 Although I will not here discuss Ellis’s arguments in any detail, an obvious objec-
tion to these sorts of claims seems to suggest itself. Why should we think that the dis-
position of some kind to behave in certain ways supervenes just on the essence of that 
kind and not on other features of the world as well? For example, it might turn out to 
be the case that the disposition of water to boil at 373 Kelvin supervenes not just on 
the atomic structure of water (or on the structure of the complex bonding chains in 
any sample of liquid water) but on the values of fundamental constants which could 
vary independently of these structures. If so, it might turn out that in a world where 
these fundamental constants took different values, water is still present, but is dis-
posed to boil at some other temperature. Hence the disposition to boil at 373 K might 
not be part of the real essence of water, because water could exist and lack this dispo-
sition. In this case, the putative law that water boils at 373 K would not be metaphysi-
cally necessary.  
 Ellis considers a related objection: that some laws do not supervene on the es-
sences of particulars alone. For example, conservation laws govern all causal interac-
tions but the mere fact that all the world’s kinds essentially obey conservation laws 
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does not show in virtue of what this is the case (Katzav forthcoming). Ellis’s response 
to this kind of objection is to claim that our world is one of a kind; certain properties 
are essential to the kind of world we inhabit, and govern the kinds which may exist in 
it, including, presumably, explaining why kinds which do not obey conservation laws 
could not exist (Ellis, 2001, p. 251).  
 The claim that the world is one of a kind is not the easiest to grasp, and it is not 
clear how it could do the work the essentialist needs it to do in constraining the possi-
ble properties of kinds within the actual world.2 Why could there not be worlds of dif-
ferent kinds which nonetheless contained some of the same kinds as in our world, so 
that members of these kinds might behave in different ways? For example, might 
there not be worlds containing some of our kinds (which obey conservation princi-
ples) and also other kinds which do not, so that the conservation laws are not meta-
physically necessary? Or might there be worlds where fundamental constants take dif-
ferent values, so that, for example, water boils at a different temperature, and there is 
no metaphysically necessary law concerning the boiling point of water?3 These objec-
tions all question whether dispositions and therefore laws supervene just on the es-
sences of kinds. At this point, I turn to a direct argument that certain laws are meta-
physically necessary because these laws do just follow from the natures of the kinds 
involved in them. In the following sections, I will consider whether this argument is 
capable of being extended into a general argument for the necessity of all laws which 
would therefore avoid the above objections.  
 Bird (2001, 2002) argues that the law that salt dissolves in water is metaphysically 
necessary. Suppose we accept the essentialist identification of common substances 
with their chemical composition, and that such identities are necessary. That is, we ac-
cept that, for example, salt is sodium chloride and water is H2O. For a substance to be 
salt, then, it must be composed of sodium and chlorine ions. But composition is in-
sufficient here. Salt is not just any old mixture of sodium and chlorine ions; these ions 
must be bonded ionically in a lattice structure. It is not just the entities which com-
pose salt which are necessary to salt’s identity, but the way these entities are struc-
tured, and crucially, the relationships between them. 
 However, Bird’s argument goes, for a bond to be ionic, it must result from the 
electrostatic attraction between charged particles. This is the definition of an ionic 
bond; sodium and chlorine ions held together by some other force, say, per impossibile, 
gravitational force, or by God’s will, would not be bonded ionically. Ionic bonds are 
governed by Coulomb’s Law, which states the relationship between the particular 
charges and their separation. If Coulomb’s Law were sufficiently different, that is, if 
charged particles did not attract each other in this way, ionic bonding would not be 
                                                     
2 Chalmers (1999) points out that it is not clear how to construe conservation laws as causal laws, since 
they apply at the level of phenomena, regardless of the nature of the underlying causal processes. He 
takes this to show that Ellis’s response fails. 
3 There might still be a functional law, making the boiling point of water a function of the value of some 
fundamental constant(s). I consider this possibility in Drewery (2004). 
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possible. Hence, for ionic bonds to exist, Coulomb’s Law, or something sufficiently 
like it, must be true. Hence, if we accept the claim that the bonding of the sodium and 
chlorine ions is necessary for salt to exist, Coulomb’s Law, or something like it, must 
be true. 
 Bird then argues that if the existence of salt requires the truth of Coulomb’s Law, 
or something sufficiently like it, the existence of salt will also require that salt will be-
have in certain ways, related to the properties of the ionic bond. For example, salt will 
dissolve in water, because this process of dissolving is also governed by Coulomb’s 
Law, and results from the polar nature of water molecules. Hence, if salt exists, Cou-
lomb’s Law (or something like it) is true, and if water exists too, salt will dissolve in 
water. Hence any world in which salt does not dissolve in water must be a world in 
which Coulomb’s Law and anything sufficiently like it is false, and so there can be no 
salt. Thus, salt necessarily dissolves in water. 
 The law is therefore metaphysically necessary, but the necessary truth that the exis-
tence of salt depends on the truth of Coulomb’s Law, or something sufficiently like it, 
is a purely empirical matter. Hence the fact that salt dissolves in water is necessary a 
posteriori. So this argument appears to show that science can not only tell us substan-
tive necessary facts about the nature of our world, but also about how things in it will 
behave. It directly challenges the Humean view that there are no necessities in the 
world, by claiming that there just could not be salt which failed to dissolve in water, 
and that this is a fact about salt itself which science has shown. 
 The relationship between salt and water, as described above, Bird labels a ‘down-
and-up’ structure. From the existence of salt we move ‘down’ in the explanatory hier-
archy to the existence of the law on which it depends, and then can move back ‘up’ 
again in the explanatory hierarchy from the existence of the law to the particular be-
havioural disposition of salt: to dissolve in water. Whether or not this down-and-up 
structure holds anywhere in nature is a matter for empirical science to determine. But 
Bird (forthcoming) cites certain results in contemporary physics, including Steven 
Weinberg’s work,4 to suggest that there is reason to believe that ultimately this struc-
ture will apply throughout physics. This addresses the earlier worry about whether 
some laws might turn out to supervene on external factors as well as the essences of 
the kinds involved. For example, even a slight variation in the fundamental constants 
would have meant that most of the heavy metals would not have existed.5 Bird and 
Weinberg are suggesting that there is no possibility of, say, water’s boiling point de-
pending on some external factor which could vary independently, because any such 
independent variation would result in there being no water. If this is indeed the case 
then there will be either just one single underlying law or a network of closely inte-
grated laws, whose metaphysical necessity will determine the values of the fundamen-
tal constants. Bird’s down-and-up structure will be all-pervasive, and every causal law 
will be metaphysically necessary. 
                                                     
4 For example, Weinberg (1993). 
5 Mauricio Suárez used this example to stress the point. 
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3. The scientific basis of the essentialist arguments 
The essentialist arguments claim to respect scientific and common sense intuitions 
about the ontology required for scientific enquiry. According to these intuitions, 
causal necessity must be objective and therefore located in the world, and the essen-
tialist account of laws and essences provides an explanation of how this is possible. 
Indeed, Elder (1994) argues that it is the only successful explanation of how causal ne-
cessity can be located in the world. But as Salmon (1982) has argued in some detail, 
Kripke’s and Putnam’s essentialist arguments include a crucial premise whose status is 
metaphysical and extra-scientific. Substantive necessary truths cannot be established 
purely on the basis of scientific enquiry. Clearly the essentialists’ arguments will also 
rely on the same metaphysical premises as Kripke’s and Putnam’s arguments. The 
question I now wish to raise, though, is whether they rely on just the same kind of 
premise, or whether they make further metaphysical assumptions which require addi-
tional justification. If so, is such justification available? 
 Salmon argues that for Kripke’s and Putnam’s arguments to go through, a hidden 
essentialist premise is required, concerning what it is to be members of the same kind. 
For example, in the case of water’s being H2O, the premise is ‘being a sample of the 
same substance as something consists in having the same chemical structure’ (Salmon, 
1982, p. 166). Such a premise, Salmon argues, can only be justified by metaphysical ar-
gument. Kripke and Putnam have not therefore shown that these sorts of substantive 
necessary truths can be established by scientific enquiry alone. 
 Bird’s argument assumes, along Kripkean lines, that salt is necessarily sodium chlo-
ride, and that sodium chloride necessarily contains ions. It also aims to show that, in 
the case of salt, having the same structure also entails being disposed to behave in the 
same way. But this suggests that, for Bird, being the same substance is not a merely 
structural property but also something dynamic, something which essentially involves 
a certain kind of dispositional behaviour. Salt cannot exist unless it contains ions 
bonded ionically. For ionic bonds to exist there must be forces between the ions in 
virtue of their charge. Electrostatic forces are essentially law-governed, and so the 
mere existence of salt entails the existence of certain causal laws. 
 In this argument, scientific facts are used to argue for a metaphysical and anti-
Humean conclusion. Bird, though, is not just claiming that the Humean conception of 
laws is incorrect. He is also claiming that on the Humean conception of laws, certain 
kinds of things could not exist. This can be illustrated using the idea of a Hume-world, 
introduced by Frank Jackson (1977). A Hume-world exactly mimics the actual world 
except that there is no causal necessity in the world: there are simply events which fol-
low one another in a regular pattern. Care must be taken with this thought experi-
ment, as Hume-worlds will not be possible on many metaphysical theories. Humeans 
will of course think that our world is the Hume-world. Essentialists such as Ellis think 
that Hume-worlds are impossible, because a Hume-world could not contain the same 
kinds of thing as the actual world. A similar claim is made by John Carroll, who sug-
gests that there could be no such thing as perception in a Hume-world, because the 
concept of perception carries nomic commitments which a Hume-world could not 
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satisfy, hence there could be no lawless world which agreed non-nomically with the 
actual world (1994, p. 64).6
 Could ionic bonds and therefore salt exist on a Humean conception of laws? The 
Hume-world thought experiment presupposes that salt is the substance which appears 
to be salt, the white crystalline substance whose empirical behaviour is indistinguish-
able from salt. In the Hume-world, there are measurable electrostatic charges on the 
ions in this crystal, which form a lattice structure. But in the Hume world, the ions just 
stand next to each other; they are not in any worldly causal relation to each other. 
When this so-called salt dissolves, this is not because of an objective worldly necessity 
we identify as Coulomb’s Law, but is just another part of the mere succession of 
events. Nonetheless, a Humean will not deny that Coulomb’s Law is true or lawlike: 
just that its necessity is not to be found out there in the world. The regularity of ionic 
bonding is sufficient for there to be ionic bonding. Thus the Humean will claim that 
Coulomb’s Law, ionic bonding, and salt all exist in the Hume-world; for the Humean, 
this is how the actual world is.  
 It seems that Bird will deny that the Hume-world is possible. He discusses a world 
in which a powerful spirit caused charged particles to behave in an exact simulation of 
Coulomb’s Law (2002, pp. 261-2), and claims that in such a world, which we might 
call a Malebranche-world,7 Coulomb’s Law would not hold, and this world would the-
refore contain something which looked like salt but which was not really salt. Thus 
there could be no world exactly like the actual world, containing the same kinds, but 
where all causal activity was due to God rather than material things. So it seems Bird 
must also deny that Hume-worlds are possible, because for similar reasons Coulomb’s 
Law would fail to hold in the Hume-world, and therefore there could be no salt there 
either. But to deny that Coulomb’s Law holds in the Hume world, and that therefore 
there could be no salt or ionic bonds in such a world, is to beg the question against 
the Humean. This is to claim that the things in the world to which our ordinary con-
cepts of salt, ionic bonding, and indeed Coulomb’s Law refer have non-Humean fea-
tures built in to them. That is, salt would not be salt unless it satisfied Coulomb’s Law, 
which in turn would not be Coulomb’s Law unless it involved worldly causal neces-
sity. This seems problematic in two ways. First, there is the question as to whether our 
ordinary concepts do indeed involve anti-Humean intuitions, as Carroll and Bird 
claim. The Hume-world thought experiment suggests that we can conceive of a world 
just like ours but with no causal necessity in it. But second, even if we concede that 
our ordinary every-day concepts involve non-Humean intuitions, this does not mean 
that the things to which our concepts refer must be as we conceive them to be. To 
                                                     
6 Carroll does not holds the same essentialist views as Ellis and Bird, and thinks the laws of nature are 
physically, rather than metaphysically necessary, but that physical necessity is irreducible. 
7 Malebranche was an advocate of occasionalism, the view that all causation occurs through God. When salt 
dissolves in water, God is the actual cause of the dissolving: the coming together of the salt and water 
is the occasional or incidental cause upon which God actually causes the salt to dissolve.  
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claim that they are is to beg the question against the Humean, for the existence of cau-
sal necessity in the world is exactly the point at issue.8
 The Humean may allow that the presence of ionic bonds is part of what consti-
tutes salt. But she will not concede that this makes the law that salt dissolves in water 
necessary. Humeanism requires the identification of kinds independently of the laws 
concerning them, since which regularities are laws supervenes on individuals and their 
properties.9 Should the course of events turn out to be irregular, so that salt some-
times fails to dissolve in water, we should then find that this was not a law. This would 
not mean that we did not have salt, or water. But, the essentialist will claim, this is not 
a real possibility. Science has shown us that the very forces which hold the salt crystal 
together require salt to dissolve: a substance which did not dissolve could not have 
just this structure and therefore would not be the same substance. But what is to 
count as having the same structure here? Merely conceding that salt must contain io-
nic bonds does not entail anything about how salt behaves, without the additional 
premise that ionic bonds must behave in accordance with Coulomb’s Law. But the 
Humean should not concede this additional premise, for this would undermine the 
Humean conception of lawhood. Instead, she should argue that ionic bonds need not 
obey Coulomb’s Law. 
 This discussion brings out something rather odd about the essentialist argument to 
show that science can establish substantive necessary truths, which is that against the 
essentialist intuitions, we also have a strong intuition that the science would be the 
same whether we lived in the Hume-, Malebranche-, or indeed the essentialist’s world. 
Or, at least, what we could empirically show would be the same. No empirical fact 
could establish which of these worlds is in fact the one in which we live. So why 
should we think that science favours one metaphysical picture over another? The con-
ception of science which is presupposed by the possibility of a Hume-world sees sci-
ence as merely concerned with the empirical facts, and therefore is often interpreted 
as favouring a conception of laws as free of metaphysical commitment as possible, 
namely Humeanism. 
 Against this, an essentialist might argue that although the scientific enterprise can-
not establish metaphysical conclusions, such as whether we live in a Hume-world or 
not, there is a plausible conception of science which does presuppose a certain meta-
physical picture. The Hume- or Malebranche- worlds allow for the possibility that 
things just might go otherwise at some point in the future: things might stop behaving 
regularly, for no reason, or because God decides they will. But against this, science 
makes a claim to completeness which is alien to these thoughts. Scientists assume that 
their explanations are the only sorts of explanations for the phenomena: entertaining 
the possibility of science failing at some point in the future is to reject the possibility 
of complete scientific explanation at all. This assumption of completeness is based on 
                                                     
8 This point is made by Beebee (2001). 
9 I am here not distinguishing between properties and kinds, but the most obvious Humean theory of na-
tural kinds will be based on grouping together objects which share properties.  
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a view of causal necessity as external, objective, and located in the world, and there-
fore presupposes that Humeanism is false.  
4. Essentialism and fundamental dispositions 
In the search for an objective conception of causal necessity, I have considered Bird’s 
direct argument for the claim that certain laws are metaphysically necessary, and sug-
gested that it begs the question against the Humean conception of causal necessity. 
However, I now wish to return to the claim that this argument can be extended to 
show that all laws might be metaphysically necessary. I will argue that it cannot be so 
extended, because it is problematic to extend the Kripkean essentialist intuitions in the 
case of ungrounded dispositions, and it seems that Bird’s argument will ultimately 
have to rely on these. 
 The disposition of salt to dissolve in water is one which can be explained in terms 
of the structure of both the salt and water. This disposition is either identical with, or 
caused by (depending on one’s theory of dispositions), the categorical base which the 
Kripkean intuitions describe. The question then arises as to whether all dispositions 
will have such bases. Many dispositional essentialists posit ungrounded dispositions, 
namely, those which are not explainable in terms of more basic structural properties 
of objects. Such dispositions will be the truth-makers of whatever turn out to be the 
most fundamental law or laws.  
 If this is so, it appears that a different argument can be given as to why the disposi-
tional essence of a substance could not depend on something external to it, as I sug-
gested above it might in the case of water boiling at 373K. At the fundamental level 
there is no structure on which the dispositions supervene: all there is is the disposi-
tion. For example, for there to be electrons, there must be things which are disposed 
to behave as electrons do. However, we do not quite have Bird’s down-and-up struc-
ture here, because we have already reached the fundamental level of explanation. If 
electrons indeed turn out to be fundamental particles, this means that there is no law 
explaining their existence, which might also explain their behaviour. If these disposi-
tional properties are fundamental, there is no deeper explanation of why electrons 
have these properties. The possession of these dispositions just is what constitutes be-
ing an electron: so at the fundamental level, the laws are necessary purely in virtue of 
this fact.  
 The essentialist who believes in fundamental ungrounded dispositions will there-
fore claim in this case that electrons have an essence, an intrinsic nature, which in-
cludes possession of certain dispositions, but there is no further explanation of this 
fact. The laws governing the behaviour of entities at the fundamental level hold of ne-
cessity, because they hold in virtue of the intrinsic natures of the fundamental kinds. 
They thus provide a foundation for necessary laws at all other levels, since the funda-
mental particles are what all other entities are made of. So there can be no independ-
ently varying fundamental constants, because everything is governed by the intrinsic 
nature of the fundamental particles.  
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 I have argued elsewhere (Drewery 2004) that the case of ungrounded dispositions 
presents problems which we do not find in the case of salt, water, and so on. This is 
because without a structural basis for ungrounded dispositions, it is not clear how the 
essentialist intuitions about what constitutes being the same kind of fundamental par-
ticle can take hold. Are any variations from the behaviour of the actual fundamental 
particles possible? For example, on what basis could we decide whether a possible 
world containing particles with a slightly different charge to our electrons contained 
electrons or not? When such behavioural dispositions are fundamental and therefore 
inexplicable in terms of something more basic, it seems very hard for intuitions to get 
a purchase, and therefore it is not clear that the precise dispositions in question are es-
sential. 
 However, a deeper metaphysical concern arises from the idea of explanation. The 
dispositional behaviour of fundamental particles is explained by the possession of the 
disposition. But by hypothesis, the possession of the disposition itself has no explana-
tion. Electrons repel negative charges in virtue of being electrons. But if this disposi-
tion is ungrounded, this is just to say that electrons repel negative charges in virtue of 
being disposed to repel negative charges, since on the essentialist view, being an elec-
tron just consists in having certain dispositions, with no further explanation. Why 
electrons should have these dispositions, rather than others, has no explanation. Of 
course, we might argue that we would not call a fundamental particle with different 
dispositions an electron. But this makes the necessity purely verbal. So for the essential-
ist to claim that the fundamental laws are necessary, and therefore all laws are neces-
sary, a source of this necessity in the world must be given.  
 Here the essentialist might return to Weinberg’s work and argue that because slight 
variations in behaviour have such far-reaching consequences, an empirical argument 
will be forthcoming to the effect that there is only one way things could be. But this 
argument, like Bird’s argument about salt and water, will also beg the question against 
the Humean in just the same way. If Humeanism were correct, all the kinds of things 
in the actual world could exist and behave in different ways. To claim that science has 
shown this is not really possible is to presuppose a certain view of what makes things 
members of the same kind.  
 In conclusion, the essentialist’s argument for the necessity of certain laws relies on 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of laws which require independent justifi-
cation. This is in addition to the justification of the essentialist premises which Salmon 
has identified. At the fundamental level, the essentialist faces the further problem of 
grounding causal necessity in the world. We cannot yet therefore read the metaphysi-
cal necessity of laws from the discoveries of science. 
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